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Abstract

This paper aims to measure the economic impact of different NBA player
achievements on the athletic apparel companies, Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour. It
looks at players affiliated with the brands who participated in three different events in the
NBA from from 2007 to 2017: the All-Star game, the All-NBA awards, and starting
lineups in the Finals. Monthly stock returns for each company were calculated for the
months the events took place: January, February, May, and June. The return of each
company was then regressed on total number of players each company had in the events.
Four total regressions were run for the months of January, February, May, and June.
Understanding the economic implications of endorsed players participating in these
events can help athletic apparel companies draft more cost efficient endorsement
contracts.
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I. Introduction
For years, the top brands in the sporting goods industry have inked endorsement
deals with some of the best athletes in the world to drive sales. These endorsements,
which are intended to build brand awareness to boost sales and ultimately equity, can be
worth hundreds of millions of dollars to both the athletes and the companies. Just last
year, superstar LeBron James signed a lifetime deal with Nike worth over $1 billion, the
largest deal currently on record. With companies paying top dollar for elite athletes to
wear and promote their products, it raises the issue: are the companies getting equal value
in these kinds of deals? Stated differently, what is the return on investment of these
endorsements? This is the question this thesis explores.
In order to better predict what companies should pay for future endorsements, it is
important to pinpoint how endorsements drive sales and thus add value to these
companies. In addition to spreading brand awareness, this thesis hypothesizes that the
athletes’ performances, viewed by the consuming public, is one of the biggest drivers of
sales for endorsed products. The idea is that as athletes perform well week after week,
year after year, in their respective playing fields, their popularity spikes. One way to
attempt to measure whether this concept is accurate is to look at the correlation between
signature athlete statistics in a given time frame and company stock returns. In addition to
statistics, we can look at what happens to stock returns when a signature athlete wins
accolades such as becoming an all-star, MVP, or wins a championship in their respective
sport. This thesis hypothesizes that the more all-stars and all-NBA players an athletic
apparel company has signed, the higher their stock returns should be. It does not attempt
to determine such concepts as market saturation. Thus, the hypothesis is a broad
5

assumption. Countless factors influence stock price and consumer behavior and it may be
difficult to pinpoint what exactly adds value to these brands.
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II. History
Viewership In Professional Sports
It is safe to say that the better a player performs, the more marketable he becomes.
As of this writing, the three highest paid endorsed players in the NBA are LeBron James
($55 million), Kevin Durant ($36 million), and Stephen Curry ($35 million). All have at
least one MVP award to their name. Do their contracts translate into revenue for their
associated brands? Presumably the companies paying these enormous sums believe the
answer is “yes”, by raising brand awareness and driving sales. Anytime an athlete is
viewed by the public eye wearing a sponsored shoe or apparel, it is an advertisement.
Professional sports are some of the highest viewed programs on television, with Sunday
Night Football holding the top spot averaging 18.2 million views.
The NFL has long held the title of most popular sport in American households.
Its viewership still dwarfs all other major American sports. NFL games averages 15.3
million viewers per game compared to the NBA’s meager 1.4 million views per Nielsen
Ratings. On the surface this may seem like a large discrepancy, however the NBA season
is drastically longer than the NFL’s, amounting to a total of 1230 regular season games
compared to the NFL’s 256. Not to mention the nearly three month long postseason
following the NBA’s 82 game regular season. Moreover, it is far easier to play pickup
basketball than pickup football. Figure 1 illustrates the projected number of viewers for
the 2017-18 NFL and NBA seasons according to Nielson Ratings
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Figure 1: Projected Total Viewership in NBA and NFL 2017-18 Season
Furthermore, recent trends in viewership reflect the average American household
attitude towards the respective sports. The NFL has seen another decline in yearly
ratings, dropping from 16.7 million average views in 2016 to 15.3 million in 2017, an
8.5% decrease. Additionally, the percentage of U.S. adults who self-identify as
professional football fans has fallen from 67% in December 2012 to 57% in December
2017 per Gallup. Meanwhile, the NBA is averaging 1.4 million views as of November
30th, 2017, an impressive 32% increase from 2016. This marks the league's highest
ratings since the 2010-11 campaign, and LeBron’s inaugural season with the Miami Heat.
Figure 2 illustrates the change in viewership in the NFL and NBA from 2016 to 2017.

8

Figure 2: Viewership per Game 2016 vs. 2017
While the NBA may never fully eclipse the NFL in viewership, it can make up
significant ground if recent trends continue. There is compelling evidence it may just do
so. One major reason NFL popularity has decreased over the last five years is the
dangerous nature of the sport. Along with numerous players sidelined by knee injuries
and turf toe, serious neck injuries occur too. Further, there has been a recent surge in
research linking football with concussions and chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE),
a progressive degenerative disease of the brain found in people with a history of
repetitive brain trauma. A 2017 study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association discovered CTE in 110 out of 111 brains of former NFL players (99%), and
even more disturbingly in the brains of three of 14 high school players (21%) and 48 of
53 college players (91%). With mental health becoming a larger topic in the media,
people are more aware than ever about the dangers of playing football. This has
translated to fewer kids participating in the sport across the country. According to the
National Federation of State High School Associations, 25,900 fewer students
9

participated in high school football during the 2016-17 school year. This marks a 2.3%
decrease in participation from last season nationwide. This is just the latest statistic in a
growing trend. The California Interscholastic Federation reported a 3.12% decrease in
participation in the 2016-17 season, topping off a 10% decline in the last decade. Parents
are taking notice of the long term repercussions of football. As the future fan base of the
sport, youth participation will certainly affect viewership moving forward.
Endorsement Deals
Despite evidence showing that football is becoming less popular among American
households, NFL viewership is still significantly higher than the NBA. Indeed, it is more
than double. Yet Nike pays Lebron James, the NBA’s highest paid endorser, almost five
times as much as it pays Peyton Manning, the NFL’s top endorser (Forbes, 2017). This
means there are other factors besides viewership that affect how marketable an athlete is.
One reason is the NBA players’ importance in sneaker culture and fashion. The other is
what the NBA lacks in television viewership, it makes up for in social media presence.
The NBA dominates the NFL in terms of marketability. Figure 3 compares the NBA’s
top endorsements to the NFL’s. Stated differently, companies can make more money
selling basketball shoes than they can footballs, cleats or shoulder pads.
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Figure 3: Top NBA and NFL Endorsements
SB Nation (2017) reports the NBA currently has 18 players with their own
signature shoe. Not to mention retired players, such as Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant,
who continue to sell their own line of signature shoes. These shoes have proven to be
extremely profitable. In 2014 Nike sold $340 million worth of James’ signature shoes, up
13% from 2013 according to Forbes (2015). That figure is more than six times what Nike
pays James annually, strongly suggesting that Nike is getting its money’s worth in its
James’ contract. An even more shocking statistic is that Michael Jordan branded U.S.
shoe sales accounted for more than $2.6 billion in revenue in 2014, a 17% increase from
the previous year, via Market Mogul (2015). The numbers speak for themselves. Nike is
turning an enormous profit by endorsing the NBA’s top players, both current and retired.
NBA players are able to drive shoe sales unlike any other athlete. This is because
NBA blurs the lines between performance and casual shoe unlike any other sport. In
addition to acting as a performance basketball shoe, people can wear these sneakers
casually at social events or to work. According to HYPEBEAST, the most fashionable
sneaker of 2017 was the Virgil Abloh X Air Jordan 1 “THE TEN,” a classic basketball
11

sneaker that first debuted in 1985 and was redesigned by one of today’s top artistic
directors Virgil Abloh. The shoe has been worn by many of the league’s top players as a
fashion statement. Often, players are filmed walking into the arena before game time and
broadcasters will take note of their outfit and their shoes. In addition to television
exposure, fans emulate players’ fashion styles even closer through social media.
Social Media
The NBA has a massive social media following through such outlets as
Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat, more so than any other sport. This gives fans a more
intimate following of their favorite players’ lives than ever before. Undoubtedly the
endorsement contract requires a minimum amount of exposure through social media.
Whatever players post, fans see. Players commonly share outfits, sneakers, social events,
and other parts of their lives through Instagram posts and stories. Often times, this acts as
an advertisement for brands who endorse the players. Nike and LeBron James recently
launched a series of exclusive signature shoe releases entitled “LeBron Watch.” Each
colorway released was promoted by James via Instagram. Leading up to the release, he
would alert his 36.6 million followers that the shoe was coming soon. As soon as James
wore the shoe on court, Nike opened a draw and selected winners.
For these reasons, this author suggests that the NBA is the most marketable sports
league in the United States. Social media following and enormous endorsement contracts
confirm this. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the magnitude of the NBA’s social media
presence. While sales data supports the impact of these contracts, another metric which
could validate the value of these contracts is the change in stock price in response to
player achievements.
12

Figure 4 Sports Leagues Social Media Interactions (Statista)

Figure 5 Leading US Brands Social Media Interactions (Statista)
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III. Literature
Several existing studies have aimed to find the economic impact of athlete endorsement
deals. Various methods have previously been used to measure this. The first metric used
to measure economic impact of endorsements on brand value is stock price. Several
studies have looked at changes in stock price on the day (or as soon as markets open the
next day) of endorsement announcements. Additionally, other studies have viewed
fluctuations in price following changes in an endorser’s status, performance, or image.
Lastly, one study traced changes in sales following an endorsement and again when an
endorser won a championship in his or her sport.
Current Literature
Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) follow 110 endorsements from 1980 to 1992. The authors
find evidence which shows that endorsements have a positive impact on stock returns. On
the date endorsements are announced, they report a (statistically significant) 0.44%
abnormal return, and a 0.54% abnormal return over a two day event period. Fizel et al.
(2008) assessed 148 athlete endorsements between 1994 and 2000, but exclude
“megastar” observations, in fear they may cause upward bias. This means they excluded
top athletes in fear they may be outliers and skew results and not reflect the true effect of
companies endorsing players. They report no significant changes in stock returns on the
day of announcement or within an extended period of time. Their results are difficult to
interpret due to the fact that they do not denote the magnitude of the “Megastar” upward
bias. Obviously, the companies want Megastar deals for this very reason. Lastly, Elberse
and Verleun (2012) report that across 341 endorsements, stock returns show an abnormal
return of (statistically significant) 0.23% on announcement day. Although the
14

endorsement initially increases the firm’s valuation, abnormal returns in the subsequent
days following announcement are statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting
that the event is quickly incorporated into the stock price.
Multiple studies also document the effect of endorsers’ specific events on stock
returns. Mathur et al. (1997) focus on Michael Jordan, and the economic impact of his
highly anticipated return to the NBA in 1995 on the five firms he endorsed at the time, as
well as 9 competing firms. They report a near 2% increase in stock returns for brands he
endorsed at the time. This corresponds to more than $1 billion in market value,
significantly greater than non-endorsed brands. The author notes that Michael Jordan is
an exceptional athlete and that returns were viewed for a small number of firms. It is
unclear if the findings would translate to a larger sample size. Farrell et al (2000), which
only observes one athlete, Tiger Woods, and three brands he endorses, examine stocks
returns as a function of Woods’ performance at 46 tournaments from 1996 to 1998.
While Farrell et al. did not indicate the magnitude of the abnormal returns, they did
indicate that Woods’ performance only significantly impacted Nike, not other sponsors.
The small sample size again calls into question the validity of their findings. Louie et al.
(2001) viewed the impact of negative events involving a celebrity endorser on a firm’s
stock returns. Their data covered 48 negative events across 128 endorsed brands. They
reported a statistically significant negative impact of negative events on stock returns,
especially when the athlete is believed to be at fault. Lastly, Elberse and Verleun (2012)
observed the impact of athlete achievements on endorsers’ stock returns. They find that
596 sporting events are associated with abnormal returns of (statistically significant)
0.08% on the event day and a (statistically significant) 0.14% cumulative abnormal return
15

on the event and subsequent day. Furthermore, major events produce a (statistically
significant) 0.16% CAR.
Literature On Sales
Elberse and Verleun 2012 measured sales for endorsed brands using dollar sales data
obtained from Nielsen’s HomeScan panel, which covers 120,000 households scanning all
their in-home and out-of-home purchases. The data comprised weekly sales in the U.S.
from January 2004 to October 2009. Sales data specified the brand and product, allowing
for the observation of sales for the endorsed brands as well as competing brands. The data
covered sales of 51 endorsements over 14,280 weeks. Elberse and Verleun (2012)
reported a firm’s decision to sign an endorsement deal typically had a positive effect on
the firm’s focal brand sales, averaging out to $200,000 (4% of total weekly sales) per
week throughout the duration of the endorsement. This represents over $10 million in
added sales annually. Furthermore, they looked at the impact of athlete achievement on
sales. The authors found that when an athlete captures a championship during the
endorsement, weekly sales increase $70,000 per week. If an athlete won a subsequent
championship, another $30,000 in weekly sales was generated. The authors did not find a
pattern of decreasing-returns, winning an additional championship does not have
diminishing marginal return on sales.
Literature On Contracts
Adidas recently released sections of their endorsement contracts with Derrick Rose and
John Wall. Among the details released was an incentives clause, specifying the bonuses
each player was paid for achieving certain personal accolades. This information is
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important because it gives insight into how Adidas values certain player achievements.
The incentives are valued as follows in table 1.

Derrick Rose

John Wall

NBA MVP - $1,000,000
1st Team All NBA - $500,000
2nd Team All NBA - $250,000
3rd Team All NBA - $100,000
Finals MVP - $500,000
All Star MVP - $100,000

All-Star MVP - $500,000
All-Star Reserve - $150,000
All-Star Starter - $300,000
First Team All-NBA - $750,000
Second Team All-NBA - $500,000
Third Team All-NBA - $250,000
Defensive Player of the Year - $300,000
First Team All Defense - $100,000
Second Team All Defense - $50,000
First round of the Playoffs - $25,000
Conference Semifinals - $50,000
Conference Finals - $150,000
NBA Finals Runner-up - $250,000
NBA Champion - $500,00
NBA Finals MVP - $500,000
Leads NBA in scoring - $150,000
World or Olympic gold medal - $500,000
(must play 15 minutes in gold medal game to
earn bonus)
League Leader in Assists - $250,000
League Leader in Rebounding - $50,000
League Leader in Blocks - $50,000
League Leader in Steals - $50,000
Dunk Contest Champion - $1,000,000
Three-point contest champion - $100,000
NBA Skills Champion - $50,000
Dunk Contest Participant - $250,000
20/10 Bonus (20 points, 10 assists average) $150,000

Table 1: Derrick Rose and John Wall Contract Incentives
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It should be noted that Derrick Rose’s base contract is much higher than John
Wall’s new contract with Adidas. Rose’s contract is worth $185 million over 18 years
and began in February of 2012, and includes a new signature shoe model annually.
Wall’s contract is worth only a base of $4.825 million in 2017-2018; which then
increases marginally and returns to $4.825 million in 2021-22. Additionally, Wall will
not have a signature shoe but the deal does permit him to collaborate on footwear with
fellow Adidas endorsers like Kanye West and Pharrell. Adidas appears to be hedging its
bets following the Rose contract, forcing Wall to meet incentives to earn a (relatively)
hefty paycheck.
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IV. Data
The purpose of this analysis is to determine how player achievements in the NBA
add economic value to the brands the athletes are signed with. This study looks at the
NBA All Star game and All NBA awards on a year by year basis from 2002 to 2017.
Each year approximately 24 all-stars are selected to play in the NBA’s all-star game,
twelve from the Eastern conference and twelve from the Western conference. The starters
from each team are decided based on popular fan vote, while reserves are selected by
NBA coaches. If a player is injured or unable to participate, coaches vote on a
replacement. Injured players who were selected as all-stars were not included in the
study.
Each year the number of all-stars signed with Nike, Adidas, Under Armour, and
Reebok were recorded. Athletes who wear Jordan branded gear were recorded as Nike
athletes, as the Jordan brand is a subsidiary of Nike. Similarly after 2006, Reebok athletes
were counted as Adidas, as Reebok since falls under the Adidas umbrella. Smaller
international brands such as Anta, Peak, and Li Ning were not included in this study due
to the limited data available on them. All player data was gathered using Basketball
Reference, an online database of Statistics, scores, and history for the NBA, ABA,
WNBA, and top European competition.
The NBA All Star Game (“ASG”) was selected as a metric of player success
because in addition to highlighting the league’s best players, the event serves a major
marketing platform for athletic apparel companies and offers an interactive fan voting
experience. Starters voted on by fans offer athletic apparel companies valuable insight
into the league's most marketable players. The hypothesis behind this study is that in
19

years that athletic apparel companies have more sponsored players participating in the
ASG, the stronger the companies will perform financially. Lineups for the NBA ASG are
announced in January and the game is played in February.
In addition to the ASG, All NBA awards is another metric used to measure player
success. The All NBA First, Second, and Third teams are comprised of the fifteen most
talented players in the league, voted on by sports journalists as well as broadcasters
throughout the US and Canada. While they are not selected by NBA fans, they are still
representative of the NBA’s most popular players. All NBA Awards are announced in
May during the NBA playoffs.
Additionally, All-Star appearances, All-NBA Selections, and NBA Finals starting
lineups were used as covariates because of their perceived importance by athletic apparel
companies. John Wall’s most current contract with Adidas offers incentives that reward
him with a hefty bonus for each of these achievements. Since “money talks”, presumably
these achievements are highly valued by Adidas, as demonstrated by Adidas’ willingness
to pay a huge premium if Mr. Wall meets them. Table 2 identifies these variables and
their respective definitions.

S&P Returns January
S&P Returns February
S&P Returns May
S&P Returns June 2017
All-Stars
All-NBA
NBA Finals Participants

Return of the market over January
Return of the market over February
Return of the market over May
Return of the market over June
Nike, Adidas, Under Armour athletes named to the All Star Game
Nike, Adidas, Under Armour athletes named to the All NBA Team
Nike, Adidas, Under Armour athletes starting in NBA Finals
Table 2: Variable Definitions
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Stock returns were calculated over the month that each of these events took place.
Returns were calculated in January for ASG lineup announcement, February for the ASG,
May for the All NBA Award announcements, and June for the NBA Finals from the
years 2007 to 2017. Additionally S&P 500 returns were also calculated over the time
period to act as a market beta. The end goal of this study is to determine if stock returns
in the identified time-frame justify the exuberant contracts from athletic apparel
companies. All dates were pulled from the NBA historical online database, while stock
prices from 2002 through 2017 were obtained from Yahoo Finance.
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V. Methods
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
I hypothesize that companies with more athletes participating in the All-Star game
and NBA Finals, or named to the All-NBA Team, will have higher returns. To test this
hypothesis, I implemented a linear model which regresses company stock returns on
corresponding S&P 500 returns and player achievement variables.
yi = α+β1xi1+β2xi2+εi
The covariates that enter the vector y include
xi1 = Monthly S&P 500 Stock returns
xi2 = Number of All-Stars, All NBA, Finals starters
Four total regressions are run. The first regresses Nike, Adidas, and Under
Armours’ January stock returns from 2007 to 2017 on January’s S&P 500 returns and the
number of All-Stars for each company in those years. This regression measures the
impact of the All-Star Game starting lineup and reserve announcements for companies.
The same regression was run using February returns to examine the significance of the
All-Star Game being played. The third regresses Nike, Adidas, and Under Armours’ May
stock returns on May’s S&P 500 returns and the number of All-NBA players each
company has. Lastly, I regress each company's June stock returns on June’s S&P 500
returns and the number of Finals starting players each company has.
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VI. Results
Table 3 outlines the four regressions. The first of the four regressions was run with the
data, January All-Star. Using the model specification detailed above, the first regression
was best at representing the data with an R-squared value of .7090. Additionally,
coefficients for S&P Return January and All Star coefficients were significant at the .01
and the .1 significance level respectively. The regression also yielded a high R-squared
value of 0.7. S&P Return January yielded a coefficient of 1.355, while All Stars yielded a
coefficient of 0.00187. This can be interpreted as a 1% change in the S&P 500 returns in
the month of January resulted in a 1.35% change in Nike, Adidas, and Under Armours’
stock returns for the month. Additionally, the marginal effect of a brand having an
additional player added to the NBA All-Star Game results in a 0.187% positive change in
stock returns. While this may seem like a small change, there are 24 total All-Stars
named each year, creating potential for a 4.32% positive change in stock returns. While it
is unlikely that any one brand will sign all 24 league All-Stars, Nike has come close in
previous years. 22 Nike athletes participated in the 2012 All-Star Game. It is important to
note again, these results are only significant at the .10 level and cannot be considered
certain. Moreover, this study did not attempt to exclude other potential variables, such as
increased sales of non-basketball related products. While these results can help influence
future endorsement contracts, it cannot be assumed that a player automatically generates
a 0.18% increase in return for his brand when he makes the all-star team.
This can also allow companies to look at the cost benefit analysis of offering
players incentives in contracts. Referring back to the Adidas John Wall contract, Adidas
pays Wall a bonus of $300,000 if he is named an All-Star starting player. Under this
23

finding, Adidas had five All-Stars in the 2018 All-Star game. Each player appearance
generates a 0.187% positive change in Adidas’ stock price. At the time of the 2018 AllStar announcements, Adidas stock price was $113.63. A near 1% increase in returns
would result in a price of $114.69. Given Adidas’ market cap of 52.79 billion, this adds
significant value to the company and their payment of $300,000 to each starter and
$150,000 to reserves may be justified. While stocks are extremely volatile, it is a valuable
finding that All-Star participation positively and significantly affects company stock
returns. This can help brands make more informed decisions on how much they can
afford and
how much they should offer athletes moving forward.

Table 3: OLS Regressions
January Regression

S&P Return Jan.
All Stars
S&P Return Feb.
All Stars

Coefficient
1.355***
0.00187*

Std.
Error
0.1628
.00010

February Regression
Coefficient

Std.
Error

0.9588***
-0.0018

May Regression
Coefficient

Std.
Error

June Regression
Coefficient

Std.
Error

0.3481
0.0015

S&P Return May
All-NBA

1.2477**
-0.0039

0.4973
0.0034

S&P Return June
Finals Participants

0.7888
-0.0083

The larger repercussions of this finding are the importance of public opinion on
athletic brands endorsed athletes. As stated earlier, All-Star starting lineups are
determined via fan vote. The starting lineups consist of the league’s 10 most popular
players. Benches are determined by coaches’ votes. The positive change in stock returns
24

0.5017
0.0057

indicates that when endorsed athletes perform better, fans are receptive and companies
reap the benefits of their investments. This positive change in stock return likely reflects
an uptick in sales of signature shoes, player merchandise, and general basketball apparel.

The February, May, and June regressions yielded different results. Player
variables All-Stars, All-NBA, and Finals participants all yielded negative coefficients of
0.00183, 0.00394, and 0.00834. Coefficients were insignificant at all levels (P-value =
0.222, 0.253, 0.156 respectively). This paper suggests several reasons why these
variables did not have the same impact seen with the January All-Star announcement.
The first being that these awards are determined strictly within the NBA and do not
reflect the fans’ (relevant buying market) opinions. While All-Star votes take player
popularity into account, All-NBA and Finals Appearances are determined strictly by
skill. Furthermore, there is much less variation year to year in the All-NBA selections and
Finals Appearances than the All-Star game. This is due to the fact that each year only 15
players are named All-NBA, while only 10 players start in the NBA Finals. Many years,
the same numbers appear for each of these categories. For example, of the eleven seasons
observed, Nike had six athletes in the Final 4 times, seven athletes three times, and eight
athletes four times. This makes it difficult to statistically assess the true impact of these
players’ appearances if there is not much variation in the data. Additionally, the same
teams tend to appear in the finals year after year. Of the eleven seasons observed, a
LeBron James team appears in the finals in eight seasons. The last three finals have been
a matchup between the Golden State Warriors and the Cleveland Cavaliers. The
Cavaliers, Spurs, Warriors, Celtics, Heat, and Lakers have all made at least back to back
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finals appearances in this eleven year span. Again, it is hard to measure the impact of the
Finals if we observe the same players on a year to year basis while stock returns
consistently fluctuate. Lastly, there are countless other variables which can affect stock
returns. Like anything else, the value of returns are determined by supply and demand. If
more people seek to acquire the stock than wish to sell, the price increases. Nike, Adidas,
and Under Armour are complex companies with many different moving parts. They make
apparel and shoes for a wide variety of different sports as well as casual wear. While the
NBA certainly has a wide following, the events simply may not be significant enough to
drive the value demand for stock shares. Moreover, buyers of stock may not be sports
fans. It may take time for the increased sales data to reach the stock buyers.
As an example of negative events impacting price, in the late 1990’s and early
2000’s Nike received a lot of negative publicity around the manufacturing of their
products, as CEO Phil Knight stated in a 1998 speech "The Nike product has become
synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse… I truly believe the
American consumer doesn't want to buy products made under abusive conditions"
(Business Insider, 2013). Even though Michael Jordan, Nike’s biggest athlete at the time,
won a championship in 1998, stock returns may still be negatively affected because of the
labor protests. Without a more comprehensive analysis of the company, it is difficult to
understand what drives stock performance.
S&P Returns for February and May were significant yielding positive, significant,
coefficients of 0.9588 and 1.2477. This tracks how the companies returns measure
against the market as a whole. S&P Returns for June were insignificant, meaning athletic
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apparel companies performed differently than other companies on average in the month
of June. This may be due to the seasonal nature of the retail industry.
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VII. Conclusions
This paper offers insight into justifying athletes’ large endorsement contracts.
The All-Star Game should be the focus of bonuses in a star’s contract. Companies pay
athletes millions of dollars every year to endorse their products. To some degree, this
paper confirms that when companies have more of their players performing at a high
level, it draws consumer attention and adds economic value to brands. This is seen in the
positive return (0.18%) added when a company has a player named to the All-Star game.
The study could be enhanced if more stock data and signature shoe sales data was
available. It would be interesting to analyze if signature footwear sales are correlated to
player statistics and achievements on a year to year basis. This could give insight into
exactly how performance affects sales and companies could run a true cost-benefit
analysis of the contracts they offer their athletes.
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